View Full Version : Palladium / TCPA & More
clicky (http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/%7Erja14/tcpa-faq.html)
It's a long read, but a good one.
For the people not aware of what Palladium or TCPA is, it's a way for all the big
corporations to control what you can or cannot do on your computer. And it's
comming soon to a pc near you.
Mill Gates
29-09-05, 01:18
Doesnt sound good at all.
If this came in, I'd buy quite a few "last generation" CPUs and Mobos (I'm guessing that only TC CPUs will work with TC Mobos and vise versa) and just keep those babies running with Linux or whatever Free Software OS I want until the world stops being completely FUCKING RIDICULOUS.
By the time that a few CPU/Mobo sets burn out I'm sure that there will be some kind of competition that isn't TC or DRMed up the ass (I hope at least).
Yeah Judge, I was thinking the exact same thing. The only two things keeping
me from switching to linux as is, is Photoshop and a few games I like to play.
I just hope that when and if this new system comes, that there will emerge some
other hardware wihout these chips. But even if it does it will split the world into
two, seeing as how you can't share files between a tcpa system and one without.
Alot of people will switch for simply this reason, so they can share files between
work and home, or school and home etc.
I really hope this thing dies before it's actually fully implemented and running.
Hated the concept since I first read about it. Would easily make me switch to Linux, I don't want to have someone else decide what I can and can't do on my computer. Its slightly different when it comes to distribution of files, but I don't want to loose functionality on my PC just because some corporate monopoly has decided that they are going to be the next ****************** in terms of software and personal computers.
I wonder how it would affect the net, I mean the current net architecture is based around non-TC hardware, so if they wanted to make the entire net TC then they'd have to build TC into everything for quite a while before actually turning it on per se, so that most of the major players on the net is using their TC hardware. Otherwise they'd just have a load of TC computers which couldn't connect to the un-TC internet.
It might be that the internet would split into TC and un-TC versions. Scary thought.
I wonder how it would affect the net, I mean the current net architecture is based around non-TC hardware, so if they wanted to make the entire net TC then they'd have to build TC into everything for quite a while before actually turning it on per se, so that most of the major players on the net is using their TC hardware. Otherwise they'd just have a load of TC computers which couldn't connect to the un-TC internet.
It might be that the internet would split into TC and un-TC versions. Scary thought.
I think its more a case of the net is just the carrier, and will carry any information regardless of whether its TC or non-TC. It will be more of a case of a non-TC PC can't communicate online with a TC server, and vice-versa I think.
There will probably still be only one internet, but even so, you will not be able
to run "non-approved" software even if you can download it, or play non-approved
mp3s, watch movies etc etc.
I think its more a case of the net is just the carrier, and will carry any information regardless of whether its TC or non-TC. It will be more of a case of a non-TC PC can't communicate online with a TC server, and vice-versa I think.
So, what happens with TC DNS servers, unless the TC people make some kind of exception for necessary net servers and allow them to communicate with TC and un-TC computers, you're going to have problems....
Like with every technology it can be used for "good" and "evil" things. Unfortunately, many sites just put the "evil" brand on the whole Trusted Computing issue, because they mix the technology with PR stuff from big companies and things like DRM.
Trusted Computing has it's uses, especially in mission critical systems, where security, trust, authentification and authorization play very important roles. This includes the used operating system, hardware drivers, and all the other software.
Secondly, there is a broad selection of hardware out there supporting it already, which means you may have bought "tcpa-enabled" hardware already without knowing it :p
Trusted Computing has it's uses, especially in mission critical systems, where security, trust, authentification and authorization play very important roles. This includes the used operating system, hardware drivers, and all the other software.
Secondly, there is a broad selection of hardware out there supporting it already, which means you may have bought "tcpa-enabled" hardware already without knowing it :p
I've followed this for quite a while, and according to various articles the TCPA hardware offers only some encryption/decryption services. It cannot actively take over the computer. IMHO the critical point is the BIOS on your mainboard:
As long as the BIOS will allow you to boot a non-TCPA operating system, you are fine. Install Linux if you like and ignore TCPA. Of course, a mainboard vendor COULD make a board that will refuse to boot anything but the latest, TCPA certified Windows version. This is something to watch out for in the future.
This said, I agree that TCPA may be useful for organizations that need to secure their computers. But even these organizations have to be careful. If a was a CIO for one of these organizations, I would base my decisions on the availability of "authoring tools" for TCPA:
Do I get some means to certify my own applications, or do I have to rely on an external service provider to do it for me?
If it is the former, OK. If it is the latter, avoid TCPA like the plague.
As long as the BIOS will allow you to boot a non-TCPA operating system, you are fine. Install Linux if you like and ignore TCPA. Of course, a mainboard vendor COULD make a board that will refuse to boot anything but the latest, TCPA certified Windows version. This is something to watch out for in the future.
4. How does TC work?
TC provides for a monitoring and reporting component to be mounted in future PCs. The preferred implementation in the first phase of TC emphasised the role of a `Fritz' chip - a smartcard chip or dongle soldered to the motherboard. The current version has five components - the Fritz chip, a `curtained memory' feature in the CPU, a security kernel in the operating system (the `Nexus' in Microsoft language), a security kernel in each TC application (the `NCA' in Microsoft-speak) and a back-end infrastructure of online security servers maintained by hardware and software vendors to tie the whole thing together.
The initial version of TC had Fritz supervising the boot process, so that the PC ended up in a predictable state, with known hardware and software. The current version has Fritz as a passive monitoring component that stores the hash of the machine state on start-up. This hash is computed using details of the hardware (audio card, video card etc) and the software (O/S, drivers, etc). If the machine ends up in the approved state, Fritz will make available to the operating system the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt TC applications and data. If it ends up in the wrong state, the hash will be wrong and Fritz won't release the right key. The machine may still be able to run non-TC apps and access non-TC data, but protected material will be unavailable.
The operating system security kernel (the `Nexus') bridges the gap between the Fritz chip and the application security components (the `NCAs'). It checks that the hardware components are on the TCG approved list, that the software components have been signed, and that none of them has a serial number that has been revoked. If there are significant changes to the PC's configuration, the machine must go online to be re-certified: the operating system manages this. The result is a PC booted into a known state with an approved combination of hardware and software (whose licences have not expired). Finally, the Nexus works together with new `curtained memory' features in the CPU to stop any TC app from reading or writing another TC app's data. These new features are called `Lagrande Technology' (LT) for the Intel CPUs and `TrustZone' for the ARM.
Once the machine is in an approved state, with a TC app loaded and shielded from interference by any other software, Fritz will certify this to third parties. For example, he will do an authentication protocol with Disney to prove that his machine is a suitable recipient of `Snow White'. This will mean certifying that the PC is currently running an authorised application program - MediaPlayer, DisneyPlayer, whatever - with its NCA properly loaded and shielded by curtained memory against debuggers or other tools that could be used to rip the content. The Disney server then sends encrypted data, with a key that Fritz will use to unseal it. Fritz makes the key available only to the authorised application and only so long as the environment remains `trustworthy'. For this purpose, `trustworthy' is defined by the security policy downloaded from a server under the control of the application owner. This means that Disney can decide to release its premium content only to a media player whose author agrees to enforce certain conditions. These might include restrictions on what hardware and software you use, or where in the world you're located. They can involve payment: Disney might insist, for example, that the application collect a dollar every time you view the movie. The application itself can be rented too. The possibilities seem to be limited only by the marketers' imagination.
As I see it, it doesnt matter if your bios allows you to do anything, since the
"Fritz"-chip will be in control and making the decisions. Only choice you have
is to disable it, if you can, but then you will not be able to share files with the
people using it.
The current version has Fritz as a passive monitoring component that stores the hash of the machine state on start-up. This hash is computed using details of the hardware (audio card, video card etc) and the software (O/S, drivers, etc). If the machine ends up in the approved state, Fritz will make available to the operating system the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt TC applications and data.
Note the term "passive monitoring component". If the BIOS boots something non-TCPA conform, Fritz will do nothing.
Of course, it will also NOT make the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt TC applications and data available. So you cannot access TC-ed data from a non-TC operating system.
So it still depends on the mainboard vendor:
only if the BIOS refuses to boot non-TCPA operating systems, you are locked in.
Trusted Computing has it's uses, especially in mission critical systems, where security, trust, authentification and authorization play very important roles. This includes the used operating system, hardware drivers, and all the other software.
I agree that the technology itself isn't evil, its the uses that people put it to. However afaik you can do this sort of stuff anyway, for example recompile the Linux kernel to not allow any new loadable modules apart from the ones that you specifically set at the time of compilation. It can be done by Linux already without taking away the rights to do what we want (within legal limits) of the hardware that we buy. Maybe the tech isn't evil, but it might well be unnecessary.
Let me put up some examples about possible security breaks: Most, if not all PCI hardware (that includes AGP gfx cards) is capable of busmastering. This means instead of the CPU initiating data requests from/to the PCI card the card itself starts moving data. While this concept is great for lessening the workload on the CPU, it's a potential security risk. Who says the PCI card is only moving data from the (main) memory blocks it is supposed to? Afterall you can modify the addresses to everything you want and thus spy on things you are not supposed to. On your desktop you have normally running multiple applications. Are you sure all of these applications behave "normally"? Who prevents you from applications reading the screen data of other applications and in that way getting informations it shouldn't?
These are just two examples, there are many more. It doesn't need the TCM hardware, but it can be used if it is present. The thing is not to prevent any untrusted code from running, it's more like having a trusted base of software running the system, and nothing being able to break that. Furthermore this trusted base doesn't allow untrusted software from tampering with other untrusted software, means they are all running in some kind of box they cannot break out of.
One such untrusted software could be a browser (do you want to trust million lines of codes for things like Linux kernel, GNU library, X system, GLib+GTK, and Firefox (+Javascript) or maybe 50000 for the operating system + drivers + basic GUI system offering you a nice sandbox to run Linux + .. + a browser in?). Afterall, you can manage your bank account(s) with a browser nowadays ...
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